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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The Arrest Of Koivu Was Done In Good Faith And The Evidence Should Not Be 
Suppressed Under Either The Fourth Amendment Or The Idaho Constitution 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that, because the officers acted reasonably 
when stopping Koivu for a traffic violation and arresting him based upon an 
outstanding warrant, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule "would 
probably apply" under a Fourth Amendment analysis. (R., p. 56.) It held, 
however, that under Idaho law the methamphetamine found next to Koivu must 
be suppressed. This Court should overrule State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 
842 P.2d 660 (1992), and hold where, as here, there has been no police 
misconduct and the exclusion of the evidence serves no justifiable purpose, the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment also 
applies to article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Koivu asserts that the district court was correct in its ruling and that 
Guzman was correctly decided and should not be overruled. (Respondent's 
brief, pp. 4-24.) He further asserts that even if this Court were to adopt a good 
should nonetheless be excluded. (Respondent's brief, pp. 24-31.) Koivu's 
arguments are without merit. A review of applicable law shows that Guzman 
should be overruled. Exclusion of evidence in a case such as this, where the 
conduct of police in executing an arrest warrant is objectively reasonable, does 
not further the stated goals of the exclusionary rule. Further, the policy 
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advocated by Koivu discourages law enforcement from performing its duties and 
encourages law enforcement to independently review lawful court orders. 
Finally, if this Court adopts the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the 
exception should apply in this case. 
B. This Court Should Adopt The Good Faith Exception To The Exclusionary 
Rule 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that exclusion of 
evidence where police officers relied in good faith on a judicial warrant does not 
serve the purposes of the exclusionary rule. In Leon the Court stated that 
exclusion of evidence is a remedy that exacts "substantial social costs" as it 
impedes the truth finding processes of the judicial system, which often results in 
the guilty going free or receiving reduced sentences. United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 907 (1984). When applied to actions of law enforcement taken in good 
faith or where the violation was minor, "the magnitude of the benefit conferred on 
such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system" and 
can generate disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. Leon, 468 
U.S. 907-08. Thus, the exclusionary rule should be applied only '"where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 
910 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
The Court then applied this analysis of the costs of excluding evidence 
against the benefits of deterring unconstitutional conduct. The Court reiterated 
its standard of deference to a neutral and detached magistrate's finding of 
probable cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-14. That deference, however, does not 
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extend to upholding the constitutionality of searches under three circumstances: 
1) where the magistrate's determination of probable cause is based upon a 
knowing or reckless falsehood by law enforcement; 2) where the magistrate was 
not neutral and detached, but instead acted as "an adjunct law enforcement 
officer"; and 3) where the affidavit before the magistrate does not provide a 
substantial basis for finding probable cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914-15. 
After rejecting the argument that exclusion will have a deterrent effect on 
judicial officers, the Court reasoned that suppression for only the first of these 
three potential flaws in a warrant would actually serve the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule: deterrence of misconduct by law enforcement. Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 915-18. Thus, assuming that the exclusionary rule ever has the desired effect 
of discouraging misconduct, "it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to 
deter objectively reasonable police conduct." Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19. 
Application of the exclusionary rule '"necessarily assumes that the police have 
engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the 
defendant of some right."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 
417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). Once an officer has obtained a warrant, there is 
nothing more the officer can do to comply with the law and, therefore, 
"[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot 
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Leon, 
468 U.S. at 921. Thus, the Court held, "the marginal or nonexistent benefits 
produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on 
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a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of 
exclusion." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. 
The good faith exception announced by the Court did not prevent 
exclusion of evidence merely because a police officer obtained a warrant and 
abided by its terms. Rather, stated the Court, an officer's reliance on a warrant 
was not objectively reasonable where the magistrate was misled by information 
the affiant knew was false or provided in reckless disregard for its truth; where 
the issuing magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial role"; where probable cause 
was so lacking that "official belief in its existence [was] entirely unreasonable"; 
and where the warrant was so facially deficient that the executing officers could 
not reasonably presume that it was valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23. 
The reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States is persuasive, 
and should be followed. Exclusion of evidence in effect sanctions the state and 
prevents judicial truth-finding. Sanctioning the executive for the actions of the 
judiciary merely lets the guilty go free without significantly protecting the 
innocent. 
Koivu argues that the exclusionary rule in Idaho serves a broader purpose 
than under the Constitution of the United States, and that allowing the use of 
evidence seized pursuant to a defective arrest warrant is contrary to this broader 
purpose even where the police acted reasonably. Specifically, he argues that in 
Idaho exclusion encourages a thorough warrant issuing process, preserves 
judicial integrity, and prevents an additional constitutional violation by allowing 
the court to consider the evidence. (Respondent's brief, pp . 5-10, 23-24.) He 
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also asserts that suppression is the "only remedy available." (Respondent's 
brief, pp. 21-23 (emphasis in original).) Besides being persuasively discounted 
by the United States Supreme Court, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), these arguments lack logical merit. Koivu first argues that suppression 
will deter judges from erroneous issuances of warrants. (Respondent's brief, pp. 
5-7.) He offers no persuasive rationale for why the threat of suppression will lead 
to better decisions by Judges. On the contrary, the systemic incentives of judges 
are so different than those of the police that the threat of suppression will not 
create any additional incentive for judges to make correct rulings. Judges, as 
opposed to police officers, have no vested interest in the investigation of 
suspects or seeing potential defendants convicted at trial. If a judge acquires 
such an interest, then the exclusionary rule likely applies. Leon, 468 U.S. 922-23 
(exclusion applies where judge abandons judicial role). Because judges would 
not be "punished" by exclusion, and are much more likely to follow the law than 
police because they have no vested interest in criminal investigation or 
prosecution, exclusion of evidence for an error by a judge would have minimal or 
no deterrent effect on judges. 
Further, suppression of the evidence discovered in this case in no way 
encourages a more thorough warrant-issuing process. Unlike the typical search 
warrant-issuing scenario, where the court's signature on a warrant is designed to 
initiate a search for evidence, here, the court likely did not contemplate that the 
issuance of the warrant in the case before it would result in the discovery of 
evidence and the initiation of an entirely new criminal case. Because the warrant 
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in this case was not for the search or seizure of evidence, it is highly unlikely that 
the threat of suppression of evidence would have played any role in the judge's 
actions. 
Koivu's claim that exclusion protects judicial integrity also does not 
withstand analysis. Exclusion of competent evidence subverts a court's primary 
truth-seeking function. In addition, the argument that introduction of evidence 
obtained by judicial error (as opposed to police misconduct) violates a 
defendant's rights a second time assumes that the defendant has an absolute 
right to prevent the use of evidence obtained because of a rights violation. Such 
an assumption is belied by the fact that such evidence may be used in a variety 
of circumstances (such as rebuttal in certain circumstances) and that courts will 
not suppress evidence merely because the police would not have obtained it "but 
for" the viol at ion. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 909-11 . 
Further, Koivu's claim that exclusion is the only remedy for the violation 
misunderstands the purpose and history of the exclusionary rule. Application of 
the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to "cure the invasion of the 
defendant's rights which he has already suffered." Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 
465, 540 (1976). Rather, the rule "operates as 'a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent 
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."' Leon, 
468 U.S. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
''As with any remedial device, application of the exclusionary rule properly has 
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been restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively 
advanced." Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987). 
Exclusion is a remedy and not a right. Evidence is often admitted despite 
being obtained in contravention of an individual's constitutional rights. Examples 
include: a defendant convicted in state court may not obtain federal habeas 
corpus relief on the grounds that illegally obtained evidence was used in his 
criminal trial; exclusion does not extend to grand jury proceedings; illegally 
obtained evidence is admissible in civil trials; and exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence is not required where a particular defendant had no standing to contest 
the legality of the search or seizure. Leon, 468 U.S. at 909-10. In addition, 
illegally obtained evidence is sometimes admissible in criminal trials under 
certain circumstances, such as in rebuttal. Leon, 468 U.S. at 910. 
Further, this Court has adopted additional exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule, including the independent source exception, the inevitable discovery 
doctrine, and the attenuated basis exception. See State v. Stuart, 136 Idaho 
490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001 ). Each of these exceptions rightly focuses on 
deterrence of police misconduct and permits admission of evidence despite the 
fact that a constitutional violation occurred. kl All of these exceptions belie the 
argument that a defendant is entitled to a remedy for an improper search or 
seizure. 
An even more stark example of how defendants are not entitled to a 
remedy for an improper search and seizure is found in the law holding that an 
officer's reasonable belief that his actions are proper may, in some 
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circumstances, justify his actions even where the officer's belief is reasonably 
based on facts that are not true. An officer's probable cause determination 
based on a reasonable mistake of fact does not render an arrest improper even if 
he would have lacked probable cause had he known the true facts. Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990); State v. Buhler, 137 Idaho 685,688, 52 
P.3d 329, 332 (Ct. App. 2002). In addition, in Franks v. Delaware, the United 
States Supreme Court established the following rule, which was adopted in 
Idaho: 
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing 
that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant 
affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the 
finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a 
hearing be held at the defendant's request. 
438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 41,592 P.2d 852, 
856 (1979). The defendant bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the warrant affidavit contains intentional or reckless falsehoods. 
State v. Peterson, 133 Idaho 44, 47, 981 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Ct. App . 1999). 
Under Franks, mere negligence in the course of acquiring a warrant on the part 
of law enforcement does not provide a sufficient basis to rescind a warrant and 
render a search or arrest invalid . The focus is, again, on police misconduct in 
obtaining a warrant. See Lindner, 100 Idaho at 41, 592 P.2d at 256 ("Appellants 
failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the discrepancy was included in 
the affidavit intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth . To the contrary, 
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the record indicates the discrepancy was merely an oversight and not 
intentional."). 
It is illogical that under Franks, evidence may be admitted when law 
enforcement is negligent or careless (but not reckless) in obtaining a warrant, but 
that under Guzman, evidence must be suppressed when law enforcement is 
blameless in executing that warrant. In this case, there was absolutely no police 
misconduct in obtaining or executing the warrant, nor was law enforcement 
negligent in executing the warrant. (See Stipulations For Hearing On 
Defendant's Motion To Suppress.) The evidence should not be excluded merely 
because a warrant was issued that was subsequently recalled. 
Finally, Koivu is advocating a policy that encourages law enforcement to 
make an independent review of a warrant and to use its own judgment in 
determining if a facially valid warrant is, in fact, valid. Such a policy encourages 
law enforcement to second-guess orders of the court and to decide 
independently which orders it will or will not follow. This is a poor policy. Davis 
v. United States,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011 ), explains: 
all that exclusion would deter in this case is conscientious police 
work. Responsible law-enforcement officers will take care to learn 
what is required of them under Fourth Amendment precedent and 
will conform their conduct to these rules. But by the same token, 
when binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a 
particular police practice, well-trained officers will and should use 
that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and public-safety 
responsibilities. An officer who conducts a search in reliance on 
binding appellate precedent does more than act as a reasonable 
officer would and should act under the circumstances. The 
deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case can only be to 
discourage the officer from doing his duty. 
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That is not the kind of deterrence the exclusionary rule seeks 
to foster. We have stated before, and we reaffirm today, that the 
harsh sanction of exclusion should not be applied to deter 
objectively reasonable law enforcement activity. 
(internal citations, quotations and alterations omitted, emphasis original). Like in 
Davis, here, "all that exclusion would deter in this case is conscientious police 
work" and the effect of exclusion in this case "can only be to discourage the 
officer from doing his duty" by encouraging him to second-guess judicial orders 
and to make independent determinations of their legality. 
The United States Supreme Court explained how suppression of 
competent evidence where the police have acted reasonably in a Constitutional 
sense does not advance legitimate interests to the extent that it outweighs the 
harm to the court's truth-finding function. Leon, 468 U.S. 897. Koivu has 
responded to the Court's reasoned opinion with mere denials. The state 
requests this Court to hold that where there has been no police misconduct, the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. 
C. If This Court Adopts The Good Faith Exception To The Exclusionary Rule, 
Exclusion Of The Evidence Is Not Warranted In This Case 
Koivu asserts that even if this Court adopts the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule, the good faith exception does not apply given the 
circumstances in this case. (Respondent's brief, p. 24.) The district court has 
already determined that, under federal law, the good faith exception would 
probably apply. (R., p. 56.) The district court is correct. 
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The state and defense stipulated below that "neither law enforcement 
officers nor prosecutors had any involvement in the issuance of the Warrant of 
Attachment," and that the deputies, "having reasonably relied upon the validity of 
both confirmed warrants, placed both Koivu and the other warranted occupant 
under arrest and transported them to [jail]." (Stipulations For Hearing On 
Defendant's Motion To Suppress, pp. 1-2.) Because the officers were not 
involved in the issuance of the attachment warrant and reasonably relied on the 
validity of that warrant in arresting Koivu, the good faith exception applies. 
Leon held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the police 
conduct a search in "objectively reasonable reliance" on a warrant later held to 
be invalid. Leon, 468 U.S. 897. See also, Davis v. United States, U.S. , -- ---- - -
131 S.Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) ("Leon ... held that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply when the police conduct a search in 'opjectively reasonable reliance' on a 
warrant later held invalid."). Here, no facts suggest that law enforcement's 
reliance on the warrant was anything but "objectively reasonable." To the 
contrary, the parties stipulated that the officers acted in reasonable reliance on 
the validity of the warrant. (Stipulations, p. 3.) Thus, the exclusionary rule does 
not apply under the Fourth Amendment in this case. 
Koivu argues that defects in the warrant process show a lack of 
reasonable reliance on the warrant. (Respondent's brief, pp. 25-29.) This 
argument is without merit. 
An officer is no longer acting in good faith reliance on a warrant where 
defects in the warrant process show that the officer had "no reasonable grounds 
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for believing that the warrant was properly issued." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Such 
circumstances that might show that reliance on the warrant was unreasonable 
include knowing or reckless submission of false information by the police to 
obtain the warrant; complete abandonment of the judicial role through 
participation in the search; no basis for a reasonable belief that probable cause 
existed; or facial deficiencies in the warrant itself. ~; see also State v. Johnson, 
108 Idaho 619, 626, 701 P.2d 239, 246 (Ct. App. 1985) (cited Respondent's 
brief, p. 26). 
Koivu's argument, that his allegations of defects in the warrant process 
show a lack of objective reasonable reliance on the warrant, is directly contrary to 
the stipulated facts. The parties stipulated that the officers "reasonably relied on 
the validity of both confirmed warrants." (Stipulations, p. 3.) The touchstone of 
the good faith test is whether the officers acted in "objectively reasonable 
reliance" on the warrant. Davis, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. at 2428; Herring v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009) (the "objectively reasonable reliance" 
standard called "perhaps confusingly" good faith). Because the defects in the 
warrant process alleged by Koivu do not show a lack of objectively reasonable 
reliance on the warrants, and because Koivu stipulated below that the officers 
reasonably relied on the warrants, Koivu's argument on appeal is meritless. 
The state requests this Court to overrule Guzman and hold that where, as 
here, there has been no police misconduct, the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applies. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order granting Koivu's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 29th day of August, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of August, 2011, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
JORDAN E. TAYLOR 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
13 
